We consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots. Under independent pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never e¢ cient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an e¢ cient "technology-renting" equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, all equilibria are e¢ cient. Comparing the mixed strategy equilibrium with the technology-renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer's surplus. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
Introduction
Sellers with di¤erent portfolios of products often compete for limited slots (or shelf space) of a buyer who wants to build up her 1 own portfolio. In these situations, sellers may employ bundling as a strategy to win the competition for slots. Even though bundling has been a major antitrust issue and a subject of intensive research, no paper has studied how bundling a¤ects portfolios'competition for slots. We provide a new perspective on bundling by addressing this issue.
Examples of the situations we described above are abundant. For instance, in the entertainment industry, movies compete for slots on a cineplex screen and television networks compete for slots on the cable lineup. Indeed, allocation of slots in movie theaters was one of the main issues raised in the movie industry during the last presidential election in France. 2 Furthermore, bundling in the movie industry (known as block booking 3 ) was declared illegal in two Supreme Court decisions in the U.S.: U.S. v. Paramount
Pictures (1948) and U.S. v. Loew's (1962). 4 In retailing, manufacturers may practice bundling (often called full-line forcing) and/or exclusive dealing to win competition for retail shelf space. 5 For instance, the French Competition Authority …ned Société des Caves de Roquefort for using selectivity or exclusivity contracts with supermarket chains. 6 In addition, slotting fees (the payments by manu- 1 We use "he" for each seller and "she" for the buyer. 2 Cahiers du Cinema (April, 2007) proposed to limit the number of copies per movie since certain movies, by saturating screens, restrict other movies'access to screens and asked each presidential candidate's opinion about the policy proposal. 3 Block booking is "the practice of licensing, or o¤ering for license, one feature or group of features on the condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released by distributors during a given period" (Unites States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156
(1948)). 4 More recently, in MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp. (11th Circuit, April 1999), the Court of Appeals rea¢ rmed the per se illegal status of block booking. 5 For instance, Procter and Gamble uses 'golden-store'arrangement such that to be considerd a golden store, a retailer must agree to carry 40 or so P&G items displayed together. See "P&G has big plans for the shelves of tiny stores in emgering nations", Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2007. 6 Société des Caves de Roquefort's market share in the Roquefort cheese market was 70% but, through the contract, could occupy eight among all nine brands that Carrefour, a supermarket chain, sold.
facturers for retail shelf space) have been the subject of recent antitrust litigation 7 and the focus of Federal Trade Commission studies.
In our model, we assume away any private information of the buyer, which allows us to depart from the existing literature on bundling that usually embraces a framework of second-degree price discrimination and to identify what can be a …rst-order e¤ect of bundling. In fact, the second-degree price discrimination explanation of bundling is inconsistent with the facts of Paramount and Loew's since the prices of the blocks varied a great deal across markets (Kenney and Klein, 1983) . Furthermore, recent advances in information technologies and the internet allow …rms to o¤er personalized prices to each customer (an individual or a …rm). 8 We consider a simultaneous pricing game between two sellers (or …rms) A and B, who o¤er their products to a buyer having k( 1) slots. Each seller has a …xed number of distinct products. We suppose that the prototype of each product is already made and thus the …xed cost of production has already been incurred. We call a product a digital good if the marginal cost of producing an extra unit is zero. The buyer has a unit demand for each product but a product needs to occupy a slot to generate value. We assume free disposal. In this setup, we study how the outcome of competition depends on the nature of products (digital goods or not) and on the di¤erent bilateral contractual arrangements between each seller and the buyer.
Our model …ts well United States v. Loew's (1962) , where block booking was practiced by six major distributors of pre-1948 copyrighted motion picture feature …lms for television exhibition. As in our model, the movies had already been produced, and each distributor could bundle a large number of movies and charge a personalized price to 7 One case is R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. each di¤erent TV station. For instance, Loew's exacted from KWTV a contract for the entire Loew's library of 723 movies, involving payments of $314,725.20. In addition, our free disposal assumption seems to be satis…ed since the policies of a distributor (C&C Super Corp.) "resulted in at least one station having to take a package in which 'certain of the …lms were unplayable, since they had a foreign language sound track.'"(U.S. v.
Loew's). Of course, in our analysis, we regard movies as digital goods even though the notion of digital goods did not exist at the time of U.S. v. Loew's.
A reference pricing strategy is "independent pricing", which means that a seller chooses a price for each product and the price of each set of products is the sum of the individual prices of the products in the set. We de…ne "bundling" as any contract that speci…es a price for every subset of a seller's portfolio, but is di¤erent from independent pricing. Two particular forms of bundling are of interest: "technology-renting"and "pure bundling". First, technology-renting means that a seller rents his technology at a …xed fee such that upon paying the fee, the buyer can buy any subset of the seller's portfolio at the marginal cost of producing the subset. Hence, technology-renting generalizes marginal cost pricing to a situation in which a seller sells multiple distinct products. Second, pure bundling means that a seller puts all his products into one bundle and o¤ers only that bundle. Note, however, that we assume free disposal (except in Section 6 on slotting contracts). Hence, even though the buyer buys the bundle of all products of a …rm, she may then not use all of them. In the case of digital goods, pure bundling and technology-renting are equivalent under the assumption of free disposal.
Our main results are the following. First, under independent pricing, the fact that a multi-product …rm faces competition among his own products can make equilibrium in pure strategies fail to exist; this non-existence is generic in the case of digital goods. 9 Furthermore, any mixed strategy equilibrium involves an ine¢ cient allocation of slots and we characterize a mixed-strategy equilibrium for the case of k = 2. Second, each …rm has an incentive to practice bundling since bundling eliminates competition among one's own products and thereby reduces damages from rival products. Third, bundling restores the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies without causing ine¢ ciency. When bundling is allowed, there always exists an e¢ cient equilibrium in which each …rm uses a technology-renting strategy, as is known from Whinston (1986, 1998) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) . Under a mild condition related to decreasing marginal social values of products, called "weak m-submodularity", all equilibria are e¢ cient if either all products are digital goods or sales below marginal cost are prohibited; furthermore, under the condition, each player's payo¤ is uniquely determined. 10 Finally, when we compare the mixed-strategy equilibrium to the technology-renting equilibrium, we …nd that the …rms' total pro…ts are often higher in the former than in the latter, implying that bundling often increases the buyer's surplus. 11 We illustrate these results through a simple example in Section 2.
To see the incentive to practice bundling, consider a simple setting in which products are digital goods and have independent values. Firm A o¤ers two products of value 5 each, …rm B o¤ers one product of value 2, and the buyer has two slots. Suppose that A wants to sell both products. Then, under independent pricing, each product of A faces competition from B's product and A realizes a pro…t of 5 2 = 3 from each and hence a total pro…t of 6. Let now A o¤er only the bundle of the two products. Then, without buying the bundle, the buyer can …ll the slots with only B's product. If instead she buys the bundle, she can replace B's product with A's and thus A realizes a pro…t of 10 2 = 8. Basically, under independent pricing the buyer has the option to buy only one product from A and to …ll the second slot with B's product. Bundling eliminates this option and thereby prevents A's own products from competing with each other.
The intuition for why all equilibria under bundling are e¢ cient is simple for digital goods with independent values. Imagine a situation in which a product occupying a slot is inferior to a product that is not occupying any slot. Then the seller owning the latter can include it in his bundle or, if not currently selling any bundle to the buyer, can provide this product on its own. Since the product is superior, it can be pro…tably sold as long as the production cost is below the product's incremental value, which always occurs for digital goods. 10 We also identify another condition, which we call "unilateral improvement", under which all equilibria are e¢ cient, but di¤erent equilibria may yield di¤erent payo¤s to the players. 11 In addition, under certain conditions, …rms face a prisoner's dilemma since each …rm has a weak incentive to practice bundling but is weakly better o¤ with independent pricing (see Proposition 8) .
In Section 6, we extend our results by allowing for slotting contracts. When a seller o¤ers a bundle with a slotting contract, he can specify the minimum number of slots that the products in the bundle should occupy; therefore, free disposal does not hold under slotting contracts. The previous results still hold, except that slotting contracts can create ine¢ cient equilibria even for digital goods and even when sales below marginal cost are banned.
Our paper generates clear-cut policy implications. In the case of digital goods, technology-renting, which is a sort of marginal-cost pricing, is equivalent to pure bundling (or block booking). Hence any seller can …nd a best response among pure bundling strategies (see Lemma 1) and competition among pure bundles leads to an e¢ cient outcome in which each seller obtains a pro…t equal to the marginal social contribution of his portfolio. In addition, under the "weak m-submodularity" condition, pure bundling allows each seller to obtain this pro…t independently of the rivals'strategies. This suggests that pure bundling of digital goods (and hence block booking of movies) is socially desirable in terms of allocation of slots and does not generate any concern in terms of foreclosure.
For non-digital goods, banning sales below marginal cost is socially desirable for similar reasons. However, such a ban prevents the use of pure bundling.
According to the leverage theory of tying, on which the Supreme Court's decisions to prohibit block booking were based, tying allows a distributor to extend its monopoly power on a desirable movie to an undesirable one. This theory was criticized by the Chicago School (see e.g. Bowman 1957 , Stigler 1963 , Posner 1976 , Bork 1978 ) since the distributor is better o¤ by selling only the desirable movie at a higher price. As an alternative, Stigler (1963) proposed a theory based on price discrimination which became a dominant strand in the literature (Schmalensee, 1984 , McAfee et al. 1989 , Sha¤er, 1991 , Salinger 1995 and Armstrong 1996 , at least until Whinston (1990) showing that pure bundling of digital goods is socially desirable in terms of allocation of slots and does not generate any concern in terms of foreclosure, absent slotting contracts.
Since each …rm can bundle any number of products in our paper, we also contribute to the literature on bundling a large number of products. Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) show that bundling allows a monopolist to extract more surplus since it reduces the variance of average valuations by the law of large numbers. In our paper, the law of large number plays no role due to the assumption of complete information.
Jeon and Menicucci (2006) consider a framework similar to the one in the current paper to study competition among publishers selling academic journals to a library facing a budget constraint (instead of a slot constraint). While both papers …nd that each …rm has an incentive to bundle its products, Jeon and Menicucci (2006) show that bundling reduces social welfare since if large publishers extract more surplus with bundling, there is less (possibly zero) budget left for small publishers.
Our game when bundling is allowed is similar to the menu-auction game (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986 ) and the common agency game. For instance, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) consider competition between two sellers facing a common buyer. They identify a "sellout" equilibrium that maximizes the joint pro…t of all three players and Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium in terms of the sellers'payo¤s. Although our model is a bit di¤erent from theirs, 12 their result applies to our setting as well. Our contribution mainly lies in analyzing independent pricing and the incentive to use bundling, identifying two su¢ cient conditions that make all equilibria e¢ cient under bundling, and comparing the outcome under independent pricing with that under bundling.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the key results with a simple example. Section 3 presents the model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze independent pricing and bundling, respectively. Section 6 studies bundling with slotting contracts. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains some of the proofs, but not all of them for the sake of brevity.
13 12 Precisely, they assume that each seller sells a homogeneous product and thus each seller chooses a price schedule that depends only on quantity. Our setting is more general: since each seller sells heterogenous objects, he speci…es a price for each subset of objects which depends not only on the number of products, but also on their identities. In addition, they do not consider the slot constraint. 13 In particular, we do not provide the proofs for Lemma 1, Proposition 5 (these results have been previously discovered by Whinston (1986, 1998) denotes the value that the buyer, C, obtains from the j-th best product among seller i's products. The values are independent but each product needs to occupy a slot to generate a value, and C has only two slots. We consider digital goods, which means that the production cost is zero for each product. Thus e¢ ciency requires that the two slots be occupied by A's two products.
Independent pricing
Consider a simultaneous pricing game without bundling: seller i (= A, B) simultaneously chooses a price p j i 0 for product j (= 1; 2). We assume as a tie-breaking rule that if C is indi¤erent among several products, she buys the products with the highest values.
14 Non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies Here we prove that this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. First, there is no equilibrium in which A sells only his best product. Indeed, in this case A can make a pro…t of 4 by setting p A g. Therefore the pro…t of A when he sells both products is not larger than 3. This is inconsistent with an equilibrium, since we know that A can earn 4 by selling only his best product.
In summary, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for the following reasons. On the one hand, if A occupies both slots, each of A's products faces competition from B's Propositions 2 and 3. These proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
14 This tie-breaking rule is standard. See footnote 20 for more details. 15 Actually, A can earn 4 also by playing p product such that A's total pro…t is lower than the pro…t he makes from selling only his best product. On the other hand, if A occupies only one slot, he can extract the full surplus of C from his best product. But then, B's best response is to do the same with his own product, which triggers A's deviation to occupy both slots.
Mixed-strategy equilibrium In this game, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium 16 ; 3]
with a cumulative distribution function
(ii) B chooses p ; 2] according to the cumulative distribution
In this equilibrium, A's best product is always sold while A's second best product and B's product are sold with probabilities 0:46 and 0:54 respectively.
A's pro…t is 4, B's pro…t is 1/2 and the buyer's payo¤ is 1.96.
Bundling
Suppose now that A o¤ers only a bundle of his two products at a price P A 0. Let P B 0 denote the price that B charges for his product. In this game, the unique equilibrium is P A = 5, P B = 0 and C buys A's bundle; hence the outcome is e¢ cient. It is easy to see why this is an equilibrium: A has no incentive to charge P A > 5, as then C prefers buying B's product instead of A's bundle. Given that B's pro…t is zero for any P B 0, it follows that P B = 0 is a best response.
Although this example is simple, it generates useful insights. First, it shows that a …rm may have a strict incentive to use bundling since it prevents the …rm's own products from competing with each other and thereby reduces the damage caused from the rival's product(s). If A wants to occupy both slots, under independent pricing, he needs to charge an aggressive price for the second product (i.e. p 2 A = 1) and this forces him to reduce also p 1 A to 2 because C has an option to buy only one product from A and to …ll the second slot with B's product. Bundling eliminates this option and thereby prevents A's own products from competing with each other. 16 See Section 4.2 for a general analysis of a mixed strategy equilibrium in the case of two slots.
What happens here can also be interpreted from the point of view of cooperative game theory. 17 If A attempts to sell both of his products, then the price for each product is limited by the added value of the product with respect to the product of B, that is Second, bundling restores equilibrium in pure strategies without causing ine¢ ciency.
The intuition for e¢ ciency is simple in the case of digital goods with independent values.
In this case, e¢ ciency requires the best k products to occupy the k slots. Suppose that one of the k best products does not occupy any slot. Then, its seller can increase his pro…t by including it in his bundle or, if not currently selling any bundle to the buyer, by providing the product on its own.
Finally, the buyer's surplus can be larger under bundling than under independent pricing. Indeed, the buyer's payo¤ is 2 under bundling, while she obtains 1.96 in the mixed-strategy equilibrium under independent pricing. This occurs because the mixedstrategy equilibrium does not implement the e¢ cient allocation of slots with probability one, and therefore a lower social surplus is generated. As well, under independent pricing, competition is softer in the mixed-strategy equilibrium than in the candidate pure-strategy equilibrium (see Proposition 1) since A randomizes between selling both products and only the best product, and B responds to this by being less aggressive.
3 The Model
The setting
We consider two competing sellers (or …rms), denoted by A and B; the extension to competition among more than two sellers can be done similarly. There is a single buyer, 17 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the interpretation.
denoted by C. We use "he" for each seller i (…rm i) with i = A; B and "she" for the buyer. Each …rm i has a portfolio B i of n i 1 distinct products and we use b i to represent a generic product in B i . Let B B A [ B B . We assume that the prototypes of all the products in B have already been produced before the …rms engage in price competition. In other words, any …xed cost related to producing the …rst unit of each product has already been incurred. For any B i B i , let C i (B i ) represent the cost for …rm i of producing one unit of every product in B i , with C i ( ) = 0. We assume that for any product the marginal cost is non-negative: given b i 2 B i and B i B i such that The buyer has a unit demand for each product. For any set of products B B, let U (B) represent the gross value that C obtains from using B. We assume U ( ) = 0
and that for any product in B, the marginal gross value is non-negative. Let V (B) = U (B) C(B) denote the social welfare for the economy composed of the buyer and the two …rms when the …rms produce B B and C uses every product in B.
Since we are mainly interested in studying the e¤ect of the buyer's slot constraint on the competition between the two …rms, we assume that C has k 1 slots and a product needs to occupy any slot to generate any value. 18 Therefore, if C buys B B
and #(B) k then her gross payo¤ is given by U (B); if instead #(B) > k, then her gross payo¤ is given by max U (B) subject toB B and #(B) k. The buyer's net payo¤ from buying B is given by her gross payo¤ as described above minus the prices paid.
We have in mind a situation in which the two multi-product …rms A and B compete in several separate markets. In each market, there is a single buyer and the …rms charge di¤erent prices in each di¤erent market. Therefore, without loss of generality we can consider only one market (and only one buyer).
A special case of this setting is the case of independent products, which we now in- 18 By assuming unit demand, we assume for simplicity that a product can occupy at most one slot in that the value generated from occupying a second unit of slot is zero. This assumption can be relaxed without changing the main results.
troduce. For any product b i 2 B i , let u(b i ) = U (fb i g) represent the gross value generated by this product when C does not buy anything else. We say that values are independent if the following property holds:
For any product b i 2 B i , let c i (b i ) = C i (fb i g) represent the cost for …rm i of producing one unit of the product when …rm i does not produce anything else. We say that costs are independent if the following property holds:
The case of independent products is such that both values and costs are independent.
For this setting, let v(
We study how the …rms'pricing strategies (in particular, bundling or not) a¤ect the set of products occupying the buyer's slots. Speci…cally, we are interested in knowing when the slots are occupied by the products that maximize social welfare, de…ned by
We assume that B is unique and we let V U (B ) C(B ) and B i B \ B i . We say that an equilibrium (of the games we consider below) is (socially) e¢ cient if the …rms produce the set B , or a set B such that B B and C(B) = C(B ), and each product in B occupies a slot.
An important role is played by the products that maximize social welfare when C is restricted to buying from a single …rm i = A; B, de…ned by
We assume that B S i is unique and we let V
We make the following assumption.
Assumption A1.
The condition B A 6 = ; means that the e¢ cient allocation includes some products of …rm 
Contracts and games
In this section, we …rst describe the bilateral contracts that each seller can propose to the buyer in our model and then introduce the timing of the games that we study.
Menu of bundles (without slotting contracts)
In the absence of slotting contracts, de…ned in Section 6, the most general contract between seller i and the buyer is that i o¤ers a menu of bundles with a price P i (B i ) 0
…rm A and bundle B B from …rm B (some of these sets may be empty), then she pays
denote a generic strategy of …rm i.
Technology-renting
A particular menu of bundles is what we call technology-renting, which Bernheim and Whinston (1998) refer to as a sellout contract. A technology-renting strategy for …rm i is characterized by a fee F i 0 and is such that
In words, if the buyer wants to buy at least one product from …rm i, then she must …rst pay F i for the right to buy, and in addition she pays the production cost of the products that she selects to buy. In a sense, …rm i rents his production technology to C by levying a …xed rental fee in addition to a term for cost reimbursement. Let tr i denote a generic technology-renting strategy of …rm i. Note that if i plays a technology-renting strategy with fee F i , then i's pro…t is F i if C buys at least one of i's products and zero otherwise. Furthermore, if both …rms play a technology-renting strategy and C rents both technologies, then she becomes the residual claimant of social welfare, which induces her to buy the e¢ cient set B .
Pure bundling
A pure bundling strategy is such that P i (B i ) = F i for some F i 0 for any non-empty
. Therefore each subset of B i is o¤ered by …rm i at the same price F i , which in a sense makes pure bundling an all-or-nothing deal. Pure bundling is equivalent to technology-renting in the case of digital goods.
Independent pricing
An independent pricing strategy is such that …rm i chooses an individual price
for each b i in B i and the price for any non-empty
In what follows, we use the word "bundling"for any pricing strategy that is di¤erent from independent pricing. When bundling is prohibited, each …rm is constrained to using independent pricing. When bundling is allowed, each …rm can use any menu of bundles including independent pricing.
Timing
We consider a two-stage pricing game in which at stage one, each …rm simultaneously makes a contract o¤er;
at stage two, C chooses the products (or bundles) to buy and allocates the slots.
At stage two, we assume that in case C is indi¤erent among di¤erent combinations of products, she chooses the combination that maximizes social welfare. 20 
Independent pricing
In this section, we assume that …rms are restricted to using independent pricing and focus on the case of independent products when there are more than k products with positive net value. 21 Then B is the set of the k products with the highest net values.
We order the products in B A and B B such that v(b
buying product b i . Therefore she buys the k products with the highest net surpluses, provided that these surpluses are non-negative.
Equilibrium in pure strategies
We …rst study equilibrium in pure strategies. Given that B A 6 = ;, we distinguish the case of B B 6 = ; from the case of B B = ; (which implies B = B A ).
When B B 6 = ;, an important role is played by the product with the highest net value among the products in BnB (that is, the product b such that v( b) v(b i ) for any b i 2 BnB ). We suppose that such a product is unique and that it belongs to B A (since Proposition 1 [independent pricing: pure strategies] Suppose that products are independent, that there are more than k products with positive net value and that each …rm uses independent pricing.
(i) If an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, then it is e¢ cient and there exists a number
(ii) When B B 6 = ;, if an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, then w v( b A ). In addition, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists if
(iii) When B B = ;, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium if and only if
)] for j = 1; :::; k 1: (4) Proposition 1(i) describes some properties of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) under independent pricing. In any NE (if it exists), the slots are occupied by the products in B , and the net surpluses of these products are all equal to a common value w , which is the highest net surplus (if positive) among the products in BnB .
When B B 6 = ;, the …rst part of Proposition 1(ii) reveals that a multi-product …rm su¤ers from internal competition (i.e., competition among its own products) under independent pricing, in that A needs to leave C a net surplus at least equal to v( b A ) on any product he sells, even though A himself owns b A . In other words, in any NE each product in B A must give the buyer at least as much surplus as it would give when the best product in BnB is o¤ered at cost by another …rm. This occurs because if w in
, and this in turn allows A to …nd a pro…table deviation that induces
For this reason, no NE exists if (3) holds. In order to see why, it is useful to consider the
hold. However, A has an incentive to relax the internal competition by slightly increasing 23 Simultaneously, A needs to decrease slightly the prices of his products in B A .
p A ( b A ) above zero, in order to extract more surplus from each product in B A . This leads 24 The next example illustrates this result.
Example 1 Consider a setting of digital goods with independent values, B A = fb 
2.
When B B = ;, every product in B A must give C a net surplus w such that w
; otherwise a pro…table deviation exists for B. However, A might have an incentive to deviate by occupying less than k slots. Actually, A's optimization problem for the number of slots to occupy given the prices charged by B is similar to a standard monopoly pricing problem under a downward sloping demand: the fewer slots A occupies, the higher is the surplus per slot he extracts. To provide an intuition, consider digital goods and assume that B charges zero price for all his products (we explain below in this paragraph why this minimizes A's incentive to deviate). Then, A's deviation to occupy
, from each of k 1 products sold but loses the pro…t u(b 
. We obtain (4) by comparing this deviation pro…t with A .
From Proposition 1, we obtain the following corollary for the case of digital goods.
Corollary 1 In the case of digital goods with independent values, under independent pricing, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium if either of the two following conditions holds:
(i) B B 6 = ; and products have heterogenous values;
(ii) B B = ; and P
] holds for at least one j between 1 and k 1.
Mixed strategies
In this section, we study equilibrium in mixed strategies in the simple setting of digital goods with k = 2, and then we provide a general result on the ine¢ ciency of mixed strategy NE.
When k = 2, without loss of generality we consider n A = n B = 2. For notational
, and with some abuse of terminology we refer to product x; y; z; t instead of b In case 1, there exists no pure-strategy NE by Corollary 1(i), while in case 2 Proposition 1(iii) reveals that a pure-strategy NE exists if and only if y 2z t. If the inequality holds, the NE is p x = x z, p y = y z, p z = p t = 0. Therefore, we assume y < 2z t for case 2; this inequality is automatically satis…ed in case 1. The next proposition describes a mixed-strategy NE: (ii) In this mixed-strategy NE, the payo¤s of A and B are x t and z The buyer buys either the combination fx; yg or fx; zg. 25 For y z + (z t)=3, G B …rst order stochastically dominates G A , that is on average B leaves C more surplus than A does.
The strategies described in Proposition 2(i) can be easily interpreted as follows. A randomly selects a net surplus for each of his products (which means that p x = x , . The outcome of this NE is such that the buyer always buys product x, never buys product t and buys either product y or z depending on the realization of the mixed strategies.
In order to get an intuition for this mixed strategy NE, consider case 1 and note that B = fx; zg and b A = y. If a pure-strategy NE existed, then x p x = z p z = y [as we argued when providing the intuition for Proposition 1(ii)], and A = x y, B = z y; this corresponds to = y, = y. However, …rm A has an incentive to increase p y above zero in order to reduce the internal competition generated by product y and to sell good x at a higher price. In fact, A can always earn x t (> x y) by setting p x = x t, p y = y t; this corresponds to = t. Then B also gains from reducing to t since he earns z t instead of z y. However, at = = t …rm A can increase his pro…t by slightly increasing above t to sell both products and earn about x + y 2t > x t, 25 The probability that C buys fx; yg turns out to be we obtain F A and F B described in Section 2.1. The probability that C buys fx; yg is only to trigger an analogous reaction from B. Therefore, it is not surprising that we …nd a mixed strategy NE in which t and t with probability one. However, the upper bound for , , coincides with the upper bound for , . It is not equal to y but is such that A earns x t by selling both products at the lowest prices p x = x and p y = y , i.e. x + y 2 = x t or = (y + t), which means that he is less aggressive than when playing = y as in the candidate pure-strategy NE. That is, A reduces the competition that product y exerts on product
x, and also on product z. As a consequence, this bene…ts B, who earns z It is also interesting to note that when y z + (z t)=3, we …nd that B is more aggressive than A in the sense that G B …rst order stochastically dominates G A , and thus B leaves on average more surplus than A does. For this reason, for instance, when y is close to z, C buys product y (respectively, z) with probability about 1=4 (respectively, 3=4). The intuition for this result is that leaving a high surplus on product y reduces the pro…t that A makes from x, which C certainly buys.
The mixed-strategy NE described by Proposition 2 is ine¢ cient, as C buys B with probability smaller than 1. More generally, we can prove that a similar property holds when the conditions for non-existence of a pure-strategy NE in Proposition 1 are satis…ed:
in such a case, no mixed-strategy NE is e¢ cient, independently of k and of whether or not the products are digital goods.
Proposition 3 Suppose that B B 6 = ; and (3) is satis…ed or that B B 6 = ; and (4) is violated. Then, no pure-strategy NE exists and any mixed-strategy NE is ine¢ cient.
If no pure-strategy NE exists, then one (or more) mixed-strategy NE may exist. But each mixed-strategy NE is ine¢ cient according to Proposition 3. This is consistent with Proposition 2 (and footnote 25) and implies that under a broad set of circumstances, neither e¢ cient pure-strategy NE nor e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists under independent pricing.
The logic behind Proposition 3 is quite simple. If an e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists, then it is necessary that C buy all products in B with probability one, which requires that w i (b i ) w j (b j ) with probability one for each b i 2 B and b j 2 BnB . But then for each product b i 2 B , it is pro…table for i to choose a deterministic p i (b i ) such that w i (b i ) is equal to the lowest value that, with probability one, is weakly larger than w j (b j ) for each b j 2 BnB . In a sense, this brings us back to the pure-strategy setting and allows to use the arguments of Proposition 1 to show that an e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE does not exist.
Bundling
In this section, we study competition among sellers when bundling is allowed. We show that each seller has an incentive to bundle his products (Section 5.1), that an e¢ cient equilibrium always exists (Section 5.2), and we provide su¢ cient conditions for all equilibria to be e¢ cient (Section 5.3). Finally, we compare the case of independent pricing with that of bundling in terms of social welfare and the buyer's surplus (Section 5.4).
We would like to emphasize that even though we focus on the slot constraint, all the principles underlying our results hold independently of this constraint. Thus, we can think of the role of the slot constraint as creating competition among products even when they have independent values and costs.
Incentive to bundle
We …rst describe an important property of the technology-renting strategies in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986] 26 For any pro…le of strategies (s A ; s B ), let i denote the pro…t of …rm i given (s A ; s B ). Then …rm i can also make pro…t i by playing a technology-renting strategy, instead of s i , in which the …xed fee F i is equal to i .
Lemma 1 says that no …rm i loses anything by restricting attention to technologyrenting strategies regardless of the strategies used by the other …rm. We will often use this result in our proofs. In particular, the lemma implies that each …rm has at least a 26 Technology-renting strategies are analogous to "truthful" strategies in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Lemma 1 in our paper is analogous to Theorem 1 in their paper.
weak incentive to practice bundling. Furthermore, the example in Section 2 illustrates a case in which a …rm has a strict incentive to do so. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 4 [incentive to bundle] Each …rm has at least a weak incentive, and sometimes a strict incentive, to practice bundling.
An e¢ cient equilibrium
In this section we describe an e¢ cient equilibrium. In this NE each …rm i uses a technology-renting strategy and hence we can consider the strategy space for each i as given by [0; +1), the set of possible values of F i . The equilibrium …xed fees are
The intuition for these values is simple. If C rents only j's technology, then she chooses Therefore, the F i that makes C indi¤erent between renting i's technology (in addition to renting j's technology) and not renting the technology is equal to V V S j . 27 Actually,
V V S j
represents the incremental contribution to social welfare made by the products in B i or, in the terms of Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) , the added value of …rm i.
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Note that if B B = ;, then V = V S A and therefore F B = 0. Let tr i denote the technology-renting strategy of …rm i in which the …xed fee is F i .
As discovered by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) (for a somewhat di¤erent model: see footnote 12), the pro…le (tr A ; tr B ) is a NE, which we call the technology-renting equilibrium. 27 This intuition may appear incomplete as it assumes that C has already rented the technology of j, but actually it is simple to see that there exists no NE in which C rents no technology. To be precise, a pro…table deviation for any …rm i is such that i plays a technology-renting strategy with a small positive
> 0. 28 Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) apply a similar idea to de…ne the added value of a …rm in a vertical chain as the value created by all agents in the chain minus the value created by the same agents without the …rm in question. (ii) In any NE, the pro…t of each …rm i is not larger than F i ; hence, the technologyrenting equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium in terms of sellers'payo¤s.
(iii) All equilibria are e¢ cient if B B = ;.
The logic for Proposition 5(i) is straightforward. If the …rms play (tr A ; tr B ), then C obtains the same payo¤ from renting only A's technology, or only B's technology, or both technologies. The tie-breaking rule selects the alternative that maximizes social welfare and thus C rents both technologies and selects the products in B , meaning that the NE is e¢ cient. 29 Note that the payo¤ of C, C , is non-negative by assumption A1. shows that pure bundling generates an ine¢ cient NE.
Moreover, if …rm A (for instance) increases F
Example 2 (pure bundling and ine¢ ciency) Consider a setting with independent products and k = 2. Firm A has two products: B A = fb In the next subsection we prove that this is indeed the case and provide general su¢ cient conditions to make all NE e¢ cient.
Conditions under which all equilibria are e¢ cient
In this subsection, we provide two (di¤erent) mild conditions guaranteeing that all NEs are e¢ cient regardless of whether B B 6 = ; holds; note that both conditions are satis…ed in the case of independent products. More precisely, when either of the two conditions holds, all NEs are e¢ cient if the products are digital goods, or if sales below marginal cost are banned. Furthermore, under the …rst condition, each seller i can earn F i regardless of the rival's strategy and in each NE each player has the same payo¤ as in the technologyrenting NE.
Weak m-submodularity
In this section we consider a class of environments which satisfy a condition related to submodularity. Given any B B, we de…ne V m (B) as follows:
where the superscript m comes from the max operator. In the next proposition, we assume that V m satis…es the following property:
In order to understand (6), it is useful to recall the standard property of decreasing marginal values:
B B and b 2 BnB; (7) which is well known to be equivalent to submodularity of V m (see Moulin (1995) ). Condition (6) is implied by (7) and has a related interpretation: the incremental social contribution of B i given B j is weakly smaller than the one given B j , for any B j B j .
But in fact, (6) is substantially weaker than (7) and for this reason we call condition (6) weak m-submodularity.
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In this class of environments, a strong result is obtained for digital goods, or when each …rm is prohibited from setting the marginal price of any product below its marginal cost. Precisely, we consider the following restriction on …rm i's strategies:
for any b i 2 B i and any B i B i such that b i = 2 B i ,
The meaning of (8) is that as the number of products in a bundle of …rm i increases, the price of the bundle needs to increase at least by the cost of the additional products in the bundle. In short, the marginal price of each product is not smaller than its marginal cost.
In particular, this implies that P i (B i ) C i (B i ) for each B i B i , or pricing above total cost. In addition, if seller i is interested in selling a particular bundle B i for a certain price P 0, condition (8) forces him to o¤er each subset of B i at a price (weakly) 30 Notice that weak m-submodularity implies that the last inequality in A1 is satis…ed.
smaller than P such that the buyer can save at least
a product b i in B i . In particular, (8) makes it impossible for a …rm to use a pure bundling strategy except in the case of digital goods, and indeed the …rms'strategies (the strategy of …rm A, in particular) in the NE of Example 2 violate (8). On the other hand, every technology-renting strategy satis…es (8) . Therefore, from Lemma 1 we know that for any s j , …rm i(6 = j) can …nd a best response to s j in the set of strategies satisfying (8) .
Proposition 6 [uniqueness of equilibrium outcome under weak m-submodularity] Suppose that bundling is allowed and that weak m-submodularity condition (6) holds. Consider either the setting of digital goods or assume that sales below marginal cost are banned (i.e., (8) must be satis…ed). Then (i) each …rm i can earn F i by using the technology-renting strategy with fee F i , independently of the pricing strategy chosen by …rm j;
(ii) all NEs are outcome-equivalent, i.e. in each NE the allocation of slots is e¢ cient and each player obtains the same payo¤: F A ; F B for the sellers and C for the buyer. Propositions 5(ii) and 6(i) imply that each …rm i earns exactly F i in any NE. Then, we can prove that C's payo¤ is C in any NE, as in the technology-renting NE. If C earns less than C , then any seller i can make a pro…table deviation by inducing C to buy only B i , since trading only with seller i generates a surplus of V S i = F i + C . Finally, since the sum F A + F B + C is equal to V , we conclude that any NE is e¢ cient.
In the case of independent products, weak m-submodularity is satis…ed, thus from Propositions 5 and 6 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Consider the setting with independent products when bundling is allowed. (ii) if sales below marginal cost are banned or products are digital goods, then each …rm i can earn F i independently of the strategy of …rm j, and all NEs are outcome-equivalent.
Unilateral improvement
De…ne U m (B) as maxB B U (B) subject to #(B) k. The second class of environments we consider is characterized by a condition which we call unilateral improvement and is described as follows: 31 for every set B that is ine¢ cient, there exists B 0 such that
The interpretation of the condition is that starting from any ine¢ cient bundle B(= B i [ B j ), there exists at least a seller j who can propose B 0 j such that a higher social welfare is achieved if C combines B 0 j with a suitable subset of B i . In this sense, there is a way for seller j to unilaterally improve social welfare upon set B; this eventually allows him to achieve a higher pro…t. The condition is satis…ed by independent products.
In order to facilitate the understanding of condition (9), we below provide two examples. 31 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this condition. 32 Since k = 2, the value of U (b 
In order to see that in this environment (9) is violated, consider B = fb We now state an e¢ ciency result which relies on (9). (ii) the pro…t of A increases by "; (iii) the pro…t of seller B does not increase, since (8) implies that
. As a consequence, the payo¤ of C increases at least by V (B 0 ) V (B) " > 0, where " could be any number smaller
. The key of this argument is that cancelling the products in B B nB 0 B allows C to save at least the marginal cost of these products and therefore the increase in social welfare is split only between A and C.
We note that condition (9) delivers a weaker result than condition (6) does since Proposition 6 determines how the social surplus V is split among the …rms and C, but Proposition 7 does not. Nevertheless, there are no relationships between these conditions in the sense that (9) does not imply (6), 33 and that (6) does not imply (9) either. 34 Propositions 6(ii) and 7 generate the following policy implications when a mild condition (either weak m-submodularity or unilateral improvement) is satis…ed. First, in the case of digital goods, when bundling (in the sense of a menu of bundles) is allowed, the e¢ cient allocation is always achieved. Furthermore, pure bundling is equivalent to technology-renting, and competition between pure bundles leads to the e¢ cient outcome, implying that pure bundling of digital goods is socially desirable. Second, in the case of non-digital goods, on the contrary, pure bundling of non-digital goods can generate inef…cient equilibria; for this reason, banning sales below marginal cost is socially desirable since this makes all equilibria e¢ cient when bundling (i.e. a menu of bundles) is allowed.
Such a ban prevents the use of pure bundling.
Propositions 5(ii) and 6(i) generate a policy implication on foreclosure even though we 33 We know that (9) is satis…ed in Example 3, but (6) fails to hold since B g and …rm A's pro…t is 2.8 < F A . 34 We know that (9) is violated in Example 4, but it is simple to see that (6) is satis…ed using
have not formally investigated this dynamic issue. According to Proposition 6(i), when bundling is allowed, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, each …rm can obtain at least a pro…t equal to the marginal social contribution of his portfolio independently of the strategy of the rival …rm. Furthermore, according to Proposition 5(ii), this marginal contribution is the upper bound of any equilibrium pro…t under bundling. The results suggest that any incumbent's attempt to reduce a rival …rm's pro…t in order to induce the latter's exit will fail. Therefore, pure bundling of digital goods cannot be an instrument of foreclosure. In contrast, in the case of non-digital goods, prohibiting sales below marginal cost is socially desirable in order to prevent foreclosure. 35 
Comparison
In this section, we compare the case of independent pricing with the case of bundling in terms of social welfare, sellers'pro…ts, and the buyer's payo¤. We focus on the setting of digital goods with independent values and k = 2 described in Section 4.2. In the case of independent pricing, we consider the pure-strategy NE when it exists (that is, when y 2z t) and the mixed-strategy NE described in Proposition 2 when no pure-strategy NE exists (that is, when y < 2z t). In the case of bundling, Proposition 6 implies that there is a unique equilibrium outcome, and thus we consider the outcome of the technology-renting NE. Then, we have:
Proposition 8 Consider the setting of digital goods with independent values and k = 2 described in Section 4.2.
(i) Social welfare is weakly smaller under independent pricing than under bundling, and strictly smaller when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists under independent pricing.
(ii) If B B 6 = ;, or if B B = ; and z + (z t)=3 > y, then no pure-strategy equilibrium exists under independent pricing and the sellers'total pro…ts are higher under independent pricing than under bundling. Therefore the buyer's payo¤ is lower under independent pricing than under bundling. Conversely, when a pure-strategy equilibrium exists under 35 In the practice of competition policy, below cost pricing has been discussed in the context of predation and Areeda and Turner (1975) were the …rst to propose to use below cost pricing to identify predation.
independent pricing, the sellers'total pro…ts are lower (and the buyer's payo¤ is higher) under independent pricing than under bundling.
Since bundling allows a …rm to eliminate competition among his own products, bundling could be expected to increase a …rm's pro…t compared to independent pricing. This is true if a pure strategy NE exists under independent pricing, as then each product sold faces competition from the best product in BnB (see Proposition 1(ii)).
But in the interesting case characterized by B B 6 = ; (case 1 in Section 4.2), for instance, such a NE does not exist and, surprisingly, Proposition 8(ii) shows that pro…ts are higher in the mixed-strategy NE under independent pricing than under bundling. The reason is that, as we explained in Section 4.2, both …rms are less aggressive in the mixed strategy NE than in the hypothetical pure strategy NE, which increases their aggregate pro…ts above the pro…ts under bundling. Then, the buyer's payo¤ is necessarily lower under the mixed strategy NE than under bundling since an ine¢ cient allocation of slots arises and thus social welfare is reduced in the mixed strategy NE. Under independent pricing, slotting contracts are redundant since the buyer will not pay a positive price for a product that will not occupy any slot. Under bundling we …nd that Lemma 1 and Proposition 5 apply to the case in which slotting contracts are 36 In fact, when B B 6 = ;, the sellers face a weak version of prisoner's dilemma in the sense that bundling is a weakly dominant strategy but each seller realizes a weakly smaller pro…t when bundling is allowed than when bundling is prohibited. allowed. For instance, even though the other …rm uses slotting contracts, a …rm can …nd a best response among technology-renting strategies without specifying any slotting contract. However, slotting contracts can render e¢ cient reallocation of slots di¢ cult and thereby create ine¢ cient equilibria even for digital goods, and even when condition (8) The result in the example is similar to the result obtained by O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) that an ine¢ cient NE can be supported by exclusive dealing. In the example, …rm B with a product in B is unable to induce the buyer to replace an inferior product of …rm A with B's superior product since A uses a slotting contract. 37 This also implies that Proposition 6(i) does not hold when slotting contracts are allowed. Actually, slotting contracts can be used as a direct instrument of foreclosure since a dominant …rm can simply buy all slots and thereby foreclose rival …rms if this is in its interest. 37 We need to note, however, that the NE in Example 5 has a few unappealing features that may make it implausible. For instance, it is Pareto dominated for the sellers by the technology renting equilibrium and seller B plays a weakly dominated strategy. Furthermore, given that seller B does not make any pro…t, he does not lose anything by proposing a menu that includes renting his technology without slotting contract at a fee F B = 1 (for instance); but this would destroy the equilibrium as A would …nd it pro…table to play a technology-renting strategy with F A = 9. We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
Conclusion
We studied in a general setup how bundling a¤ects competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having a slot constraint. In particular, in the case of digital goods, we obtained a number of clear-cut results. When bundling is prohibited, equilibrium in pure strategies generically fails to exist because of the internal competition among the products belonging to a same seller, and any mixed-strategy equilibrium involves ine¢ cient allocation of slots. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to practice bundling in order to eliminate the internal competition and, under the mild condition of weak m-submodularity, there is a unique equilibrium outcome that is e¢ cient. Each seller can …nd a best response among pure bundling strategies and competition among pure bundles leads to the unique equilibrium outcome mentioned above. Furthermore, pure bundling allows each seller to obtain a pro…t equal to the social marginal contribution of his portfolio independently of the rival's strategy.
This suggests that pure bundling of digital goods (and hence block booking of movies)
is socially desirable for e¢ cient allocation of slots and that it cannot be used as an instrument of foreclosure.
Even though we focused on the slot constraint, all the principles underlying our results
hold independently of such a constraint. As challenging issues for future studies, it would be interesting to explore a dynamic setting in which we make the portfolio of each …rm endogenous. It would be also interesting to explicitly model a buyer as a downstream …rm and study the interaction between bundling at upstream level and bundling at downstream level, which is very relevant for cable TV. 38 Proof of Proposition 1 (i) The proof is organized in three steps.
Step 1 In any NE, the buyer buys k products.
Suppose that C buys less than k products and thus leaves some slots empty; this requires that less than k products have positive or zero net surplus. Let b i denote a product in B which C does not buy: then necessarily p i (b i ) > u(b i ). Hence, a pro…table deviation
. Now one more product gives a positive net surplus and C buys b i as well as the products she was buying previously. The pro…t of …rm i increases by
Step 2 Let B denote the set of products purchased by the buyer in an arbitrary NE; then w i (b i ) = w for any b i 2 B, for some w 0.
If b i and b j are in B and w i (b i ) > w j (b j ) (not necessarily j 6 = i), then for …rm i it is pro…table to increase p i (b i ) slightly because then C will still buy the products in B and therefore …rm i will make a higher pro…t. Hence, w i (b i ) = w j (b j ) for any b i and b j in B and we let w denote this common value.
Step 3 In any NE the slots are occupied by the e¢ cient products, that is the buyer buys B ; furthermore, w = maxf0; max b i 2BnB fw i (b i )gg.
Suppose that C buys a set B which consists of k products (by Step 1) but there is some product b i in B which is not in B. We need to distinguish the case in which there exists a productb i 2 B i nB i from the case in which B i B i .
In 
and this expression is positive since
In the second case there exists a product b j of …rm j 6 = i in B j nB j . By step 2, u(b j )
is the pro…t of …rm j from the sale of b j ;
and reducing the price of each other product in B i by "; in this way C continues to buy all the products in B i and in addition she buys b i as well. The pro…t of …rm i varies by
In order to see that w = maxf0; max b i 2BnB fw i (b i )gg, note that if w is smaller than maxf0; max b i 2BnB fw i (b i )gg, then C does not buy all the products in B . If w > maxf0; max b i 2BnB fw i (b i )gg, then …rm i with B i 6 = ; can increase his pro…t by slightly increasing the prices of his products in B i since then C will still purchase them.
(ii)
Step
If w < v( b A ), then we exhibit a pro…table deviation for A:
and reduce by 
Step 2 If (3) is satis…ed, then no NE exists.
When (3) holds we have that v( b
Step 1 in the proof of (ii) we infer that w v( b A ) > 0 and Step 3 in the proof of (i) implies that
What is the most relevant is that w > w . Regarding A's deviations, the most favorable case for the existence of NE is when w is small as this maximizes the pro…t of A,
The only potentially pro…table deviations for A are such that he sells fewer than k products to C. The lower are the prices p B (b Proof. Given (p x ; p y ) such that x p x < y p y , let denote the probability that C buys both products x and y and let denote the probability that C buys only y among the products of A. The expected pro…t of A is then (p x + p y ) + p y . Now consider (p Now we verify that A's strategy in Proposition 2(i) is a best reply to B's strategy.
As it is well known, it su¢ ces to consider pure strategies of A, and Lemma 2 allows to restrict to pure strategies satisfying x p x y p y . Consider …rst p y 2 [ Then x p x y p y t holds and thus C certainly purchases product x; hence it is suboptimal for A to play p x < x y + p y . Given p x = x y + p y , we …nd (y + t) with probability one and x p x y p y implies that C buys both x and y; therefore the pro…t of A is smaller than x (y t) = x t.
39 The strict inequality in (10) is correct in case 1, while in case 2 we should write Prfy p y g.
But in fact there are no practical di¤erences between the two cases, as G B has no atoms.
Playing p y > y t is not a pro…table deviation since then y p y < t -thus C certainly does not buy y -and in order to induce C to buy product x, A cannot set p x larger than x t given that z p z t with probability one and p t = 0. Now we verify that B's strategy in Proposition 2(i) is a best reply to A's strategy.
Since x p x = y p y t, C does not buy product t and B only needs to choose p z .
When he plays p z 2 [z t; z t), his payo¤ is
for any p z 2 [z t; z t). 40 Playing p z = z t is not a pro…table deviation since then C does not buy product z in case 2 and buys it with probability G A (t) = 2z t y 2z 2t in case 1 (then, the pro…t of B is 2z y t 2z 2t
(y + t)). Playing p z > z t is not a pro…table deviation as it implies z p z < t and certainly C does not buy product z.
Finally, playing p z < z
y is not a pro…table deviation since C buys product z but B's pro…t is smaller than z t.
(ii) The payo¤s of the two …rms are obtained in (10) and (11) . Let a denote the probability that C buys y given the mixed strategies; then
For the example in Section 2, with (x; y; z; t) = (4; 3; 2; 0), we …nd a = 3 2
(1 + ln 1 2 ) ' 0:46.
(4z y + t) + 2zy ty + 2tz y 2 > 0, and y z + (z t)=3 implies that h is strictly decreasing with respect to 2 [t; (y + t)) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1 If B B = ? and (4) is violated, then no pure-strategy NE exists and no e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists. 40 The weak inequality in (11) is correct in case 1, while in case 2 we should write Prfz p z > g. But in fact there are no practical di¤erences between the two cases, as z p z belongs to (t; When B B = ? and (4) is violated, we know from Proposition 1(iii) that no pure-strategy NE exists. We now show that no e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists.
Since B B = ?, e¢ ciency requires that C buy all the products in B A with probability one, and nothing else; this implies B = 0. Therefore 
Since there exists no pure-strategy NE, we know from Proposition 1(iii) and (4) that there is some| between 1 and k 1 such that P
A ; :::; b| A g is de…nitely not a pro…table deviation for A since the surplus he needs to leave to C for each of the| products in 
holds for a certain| < k. We now exhibit a pro…table deviation for …rm A: 
A ; :::; b| A g, and his total pro…t is
)], which is larger than his (supposed) equilibrium pro…t A , given (12).
Step 2 If B B 6 = ? and (3) is satis…ed, then no pure-strategy NE exists and no e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists.
When B B 6 = ? and (3) holds, we know from Proposition 1(ii) that no pure-strategy NE exists: We now show that no e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists.
We assume that an e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists and we derive a contradiction.
E¢ ciency requires that C buy all products in B A and B B with probability one. Therefore payo¤ than with (s i ; s j ) without buying at least one product of …rm i, because otherwise she would not buy anything from i given (s i ; s j ), and this contradicts i > 0. ". This deviation of B is pro…table if and only if the buyer buys at least one product from …rm B. In order to prove that this is the case, we note …rst that if the buyer does not buy anything from B, then she buys only bundles o¤ered by A and they cannot yield C a payo¤ larger than C ;
otherwise we obtain a contradiction with the fact that the initial strategies generating payo¤s ( A ; B ; C ) constitute a NE. We end the proof by observing that if the buyer pays F B and trades only with …rm B, a social surplus of V S B is generated and the buyer obtains V
S B B
", which is larger than C .
(iii) Suppose that C purchases an ine¢ cient set of products. Then an ine¢ ciently low social surplus V (< V ) is generated, with payo¤s A 0; B 0; C 0 such that A + B + C = V . Now suppose that A plays a technology-renting strategy with We prove that, for any strategy of …rm B, the buyer rents A's technology, and thus A Step 1 higher payo¤ by renting A's technology than by not renting it; in case of equality, the tie-breaking rule favors renting A's technology because the social surplus is higher.
Step 2 The case in which (8) needs to be satis…ed. 
Consider
From (6), we obtain (ii)
Step 1 In any NE the payo¤ of the buyer is equal to C , the buyer's payo¤ in the technology-renting NE. Step 2 Each NE is e¢ cient.
From Propositions 5(ii) and 6(i), and from Step 1, we know that in any NE the pro…ts of the …rms are F A ; F B and the payo¤ of the buyer is C . Since F A + F B + C = V , it follows that any NE generates a social surplus equal to V , and thus it is e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 7
Step 1 The case in which (8) needs to be satis…ed.
Suppose that in equilibrium C buys a set B which is ine¢ cient. Then, from (9) Precisely, we need to show that
From (8) we obtain P i (B i ) P i (B Step 2 The case of digital goods. 
Proof of Proposition 8
The result is immediate from Propositions 1, 2 and 6.
